Mainly because I need to get a non-political blog in the top position again (because I'm certainly no expert on virtualization security, but I am a virtualization end user who wants to know! ) but
Simon Crosby's reaction to
Hoff gives me a feeling of deja view in terms of the bait-and-switch approach to vulns I've heard from some SCADA vendors (or control systems standards efforts) over the years.
Although slightly more sophisticated than spouting off how many bits of encryption a protocol uses, saying that a given protocol is not Internet-facing, or claiming that to fix an implementation flaw in a weak protocol you should upgrade to protocol that uses SSL, some of the security cliches (or at worst, half truths) that undermine his credibility, and even I can recognize include:
- Open source is more secure...
- He mentions viruses and virus vendors in his first breath.
- Equating security fixes with security/insecurity (and slamming VMWare!)
- Bringing up EAL something or other
- Mentioning TPM in any context
Knowing a thing or two about mania, I'm also curious about this sort of manic efforts (apart from making it so small you can't even see it) to secure the hypervisor, and whether he is willing to admit that there are some classes of attacks against guests (or, obviously, against the hypervisor) that are unique (or perhaps only possible) in a virtualized environment and that they care about? Or will the AV vendors solve these, too?
Done. There no more
faux Hillary (or
Hilter) on top. Can sleep now.
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