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Looks like they are actually starting to address twamming or or whatever (tweet-spam) is called. Cause I went to block JENNY and got this image.
Good for them. About time.
How long until they get non-Base64 authentication?
The end of vulnerabilities. Alternating between Python and Ruby; R&D, Consulting, and Ops; Linux and BSD. Moving from Austin to Skokie to Baltimore. Adoptive to Bio. Republican to Democrat, and other Things Done Backwards
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/gmail?
ik=344af70c5d
&view=cv
&search=inbox
&th=101865c04ac2427f
&lvp=-1
&cvp=0
&zx=9m4966e44e98uu
As you can see, this the message ID of the message I clicked on.
But the others are mysterious at the moment. At this point in the
proceedings, alarms went off in my head.Why, I was thinking, is
the variable for message ID th—when that probably stands for thread.
So, I sent a few mails back and forth to create a thread, and loaded
the Inbox and the message back up
The thing about security is that it requires stakeholders. I have a security background, but Twitter’s security isn’t my job. In fact, my job is pretty much the opposite: I open up as much of Twitter’s functionality as I can without (hopefully) making the system insecure. So while I’ve usually been a “first responder” to security incidents because of my background, it requires a major mental context switch from the work I normally do.This post is depressing on a number of levels, mainly because it reminds me of the attitudes (and my own personal frustrations) from back in the early years of doing product security at Cisco.
Several months after I joined Twitter in early 2007, I suggested to the team that we do a full internal security audit. Stop all work, context switch to Bad Guy Mode, find issues, fix them. I wish I could say that we’ve done that audit in its entirety, but the demands of a growing product supported by a tiny team overshadowed its priority. Now we‘re in an unwelcome position that many technical organizations get into: so far into a big code-base that’s never seen any substantial periodic audits that the only way to really find all the issues is to bring in some outside help – something I sincerely hope we end up doing, but is not my call.
The big takeaway for me from this incident is that we need an environment where researchers and security vendors can trust each other. Alexander has explained why his team did not feel they could place that trust in VeriSign. I have explained why I feel they could have. We at VeriSign would like to see an environment where researchers need not mistrust security vendors and vice versa. We're committed to doing our part to bring back that environment, and we encourage security researchers in the future to reach out directly to us. We promise to treat you fairly and respectfully.
In an SQL database, as needs evolve the schema and storage of the existing data must be updated. This often causes problems as new needs arise that simply weren’t anticipated in the initial database designs, and makes distributed “upgrades” a problem for every host that needs to go through a schema update.
CouchDB is a peer based distributed database system. Any number of CouchDB hosts (servers and offline-clients) can have independent “replica copies” of the same database, where applications have full database interactivity (query, add, edit, delete). When back online or on a schedule, database changes are replicated bi-directionally.
[root@moodle_dev utils]# make
gcc -std=gnu99 -g -O2 -Wl,-O1 -o start-stop-daemon start-stop-daemon.o ../get
opt/libopt.a
[root@moodle_dev utils]# ls
enoent enoent.o Makefile.am start-stop-daemon start-stop-daemon.o
enoent.c Makefile Makefile.in start-stop-daemon.c
[root@moodle_dev utils]# make install
make[1]: Entering directory `/root/dpkg-1.13.26/utils'
test -z "/usr/local/lib/dpkg" || mkdir -p -- "/usr/local/lib/dpkg"
/usr/bin/install -c 'enoent' '/usr/local/lib/dpkg/enoent'
test -z "/usr/local/sbin" || mkdir -p -- "/usr/local/sbin"
/usr/bin/install -c 'start-stop-daemon' '/usr/local/sbin/start-stop-daemon'
make[1]: Nothing to be done for `install-data-am'.
make[1]: Leaving directory `/root/dpkg-1.13.26/utils'